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INTRODUCTION
Useful, although not necessary, points of departure for this paper
are some comments that emerged in two recent contributions to progressive
political debate at the University of Natal. These two contributions
are Erwin's address to the University Forum on "Trade Unions and Politics"
and Freund et al's contribution to the South African Labour Bulletin
and the Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa Seminar on the "November
Stayaway". In both of these presentations there appeared to be an enhanced
interest, on the part of intellectuals of the progressive labour movement,
in what I shall term as South Africa's urban reproductive crises. We
have become accustomed to hearing from both liberal-reformists and
radical-liberals about such crises in South Africa. These latter
groups, of course, have addressed the issues in a different manner
to Erwin and Freund et al because of their differing political priorities,
but they have persistently addressed them all the same. The fact that
we are now increasingly hearing from trade union-linked intellectuals
on living place issues, however, is a fact that I take as a significant
departure in the course of South Africa's urban and regional politics.
As I understand Erwin, for example, it is being recognized now in the
progressive labour movement that South Africa's process of capitalist
accumulation has been based, in part, upon industrialization without
associated social investment in the sphere of urban reproduction. In
consequence, the organized workers struggle is turning, as organizational
resources permit, towards sites of struggle previously dominated by
the opposition politics of liberal-reform and radical-liberal groupings.
In similar vein, Freund et al (1985, p.93) drew as their first conclusion
from the November Stayaways the fact that the events "crystal 1 i sed
the central contradiction of state policy - the 'liberalization of
the industrial relations system without meaningful political and social
change". They then went on to observe that "hitherto the major trade
unions have focussed on factory floor issues avoiding involvement in
more overtly political issues", but that "the state's failure to respond
to the educational demands of students and the growing crisis in the
townships have propelled the trade unions beyond the factory floor".
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I do not have the expertise to comment on the question of students
and educational demands, but I would like to attempt an analysis of
how this new turn of events might begin to affect the politics of trans-
port, rents and urban development in South Africa. Previously I have
dealt with these issues, both in research and practice, through the
conceptual frameworks of Marxist scholars of urbanism such as Borja
(1977), Castells (1977;1983), Harvey (1978;1982) and Mingione (1981)
(cf. McCarthy and Smit, 1984; McCarthy and Friedman, 1985). These European
writers have not been yery concerned with the practices of those organiz-
ing labour at the point of production in their own societies. Indeed,
the typical concern of such authors has been with the so-called "unifica-
tion tendencies" (Mingoine, 1981, p.18) that can emerge within the
working classes (and not necessarily just wage workers) during the
course of progressive organization around urban reproductive crises
(cf. Borja, 1977, pp.202-203, Castells, 1977, pp.324-378). A key construct
which emerged from this literature is that of "urban social movements"
-- a term that was first introduced into our vocabulary by Castells
(1977), and which has subsequently captured the imagination of most
progressive scholars concerned with the politics of urban reproduction
(see, for example, successive issues of the International Journal of
Urban and Regional Research). The question thus emerges as to how the
concepts of urban reproductive crises and urban social movements can
be reconciled, if at all, with the emergent politics of South Africa's
progressive labour movement. This question becomes particularly germane
in the light of parallel developments in radical-liberal and liberal-
reform politics where organizations such as the U.D.F. and the Urban
Foundation have gained substantial footholds on the terrain of the
politics of urban reproduction over the past few years.
The structure of the present paper, therefore, is as follows. In the
section immediately to follow I outline Castell's (1977) seminal contribu-
tion to the theory of urban social movements, and I also discuss the
alternative concept of urban reproductive crises. In the section following
this I set out my basic assumptions about the historically specific
political context that I am addressing: progressive politics in South
Africa in the 1980's. A penultimate section of the paper addresses,
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both theoretically and empirically, the problem of urban social movements
and so-called community politics in South Africa today. The issues
of housing and rent struggles are taken as illustrative of the argument
that both the concept of urban social movements and that of community
politics may be unhelpful to the progressive cause at the present time.
With the aid of data from the Eastern Cape, the concluding
section sketches out my understanding of how a coherent progressive
politics of urban reproduction should emerge in South Africa in the
future.
URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND URBAN REPRODUCTIVE CRISES
We can begin with some descriptive observations on the nature of so-
called urban social movements. Castells (1983,XVIII) observes in the
introduction to The City and the Grassroots that "urban social movements,
in our societies and in our epoch, seem to develop around three major
themes:
1. Demands focussed on collective consumption, that is, goods and
services directly or indirectly provided by the state.
2. Defence of cultural identity associated with and organized around
a specific territory.
3. Political mobilization in relationship to the state, particularly
emphasizing the role of local government".
This, most would agree, is an accurate enough description of the wide
range of urban protest movements current in South African cities today.
Rent boycotts, opposition to relocation, demands for urban services,
boycotts of local government elections, bus boycotts and the mass
re-emergence of locality-based civic associations, to name but a few,
all fall within the ambit of such a definition.
To agree that Castells' (1983) definition of urban social movements
suits a wide range of urban protest conditions in South Africa today,
however, succeeds only in raising the more fundamental question of
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the political and theoretical utility of the concept itself. In his
original pathbreaking work, The Urban Question, Castells (1977) made
two major hypotheses: First, that there exist a set of within-state
practices with regard to urban reproduction that tend towards reform
or regulation of status quo relations of production and reproduction;
and, second, that there exist a set of extra-state mobilizations (called
urban social movements) that can be directed, together with other progres-
sive organizations, towards the realization of socialist and/or revolut-
ionary gains ^ Tj_j_y_U the state (cf. Castells, 1977, pp.376-8).
These hypotheses, developed and tested during the period of the late
I9601s and early 1970's in France, have subsequently drawn rebuttals
from American and British left-wing intellectuals in particular. Specifi-
cally, Castells (1978) is accused of dehistoricizing theory and offering
us the political context of France in a particular period as a basis
for both understanding and responding to urban reproductive crises
elsewhere (Duncan, 1982). And, secondly, he is pilloried for his alleged
Althuserian "functional ism" with regard to state practices in the
urban reproductive sphere (cf. Saunders, 1982).
It was in this context, of course, that Castells (1983) embarked upon
his search for a "cross cultural theory of urban social movements"
in The City and the Grassroots. Unfortunately, however, and possibly
as a result of the existential reality of his being installed as Profes-
sor of Urban and Regional Planning at Berkeley, Castells (1983) relocates
his interest in urban social movements from their relationship to
general political theory to their effect on urban spatial structures
and environments. The ambitions of The Urban Question, therefore,
now take back seat to a more relaxed and descriptive geographical
survey of the physical form of cities and their relationship to notable
urban protest events. In consequence, Castells1 (1983) most recent
statements are probably of less immediate political interest in South
Africatoday than his earlier hypotheses.
Apart from his observations in The City and the Grassroots that class
relationships "are by no means the only or even the primary source
of urban social change" and that "the autonomous form of the state,
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gender relationships and ethnic and national movements" must be incorpor-
ated into the analysis of urban social movements, Castells (1983, XVIII)
appears to have lost interest in what he now terms "the artificial
paradises of the grand theory". For many South Africans, however, the
relationship of urban social movements to problems of social theory
remains of considerable practical interest.
Most obvious, in this regard, are the respective strategic concerns
of the progressive labour movement, liberal reformers, and the national
democratic movement with respect to crises occurring within the sphere
of urban reproduction. There is no need to excavate the details of
these respective concerns here, but it can at least be recognized that
each position presupposes a relationship of urban reproductive crises
to some more general theory of social change in South Africa. I stress,
at this stage, the relationship between particular political programmes
and urban reproductive crises, as opposed to any associated movements,
because we would be doing Castells1 (1977) hypotheses a disservice
by beginning with practices rather than the crises that gave rise to
them in the first place. After all, as Castells (1976) wrote in criticism
of traditional studies in urban politics: "We cannot base urban research
on the analysis of actors and their strategies without first analyzing
the urban issues, and the contradictions in the social structure which
they express".
To return to the crises and their relationship to theories of social
change, then, my understanding of South Africa's progressive labour
movement, is that intellectuals within it envisage, in more or less
classically Marxian terms, the development of the South African working
class's collective consciousness and power to the point where it can
precipitate a crisis in production relationships and subsequently appro-
priate state power (so as to usher in a new socialist order). To the
extent that urban reproductive crises can be connected to such a process
their relevance or otherwise to the socialist project can be sustained.
Radical-liberal intellectuals of the national democratic movement,
on the other hand, envisage a development of popular protest politics
to a point which deepens the state's legitimation crisis sufficiently
for a national convention to be reached, from which a more equitable
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distribution of access to state power might emerge. In this case urban
reproductive crises are relevant insofar as they might either enhance
or detract from the general legitimation crisis of the state. Both
intellectuals of the progressive labour movement and the national democra-
tic movement, however, surmise a greater degree of fragility of ruling
class power than is considered realistic by establishment reformers.
Urban reproductive crises, therefore, are of interest to reformers
mostly from the point of view of their relevance to the process of
smoothing out contradictions in the social order and the possibilities
they create for enhancing the.legitimacy of privatized social relations.
I believe that it is beyond our competence to scientifically "verify"
any one of these views -- radical, radical-liberal or reform liberal
-- in terms of their respective diagnoses of the projected trajectory
of social change in South Africa. They represent, rather, "expectations"
which are conditioned according to a complex of economic, social and
psychological tensions that impact upon each of us differently. However,
social science methodology can assist us in sorting out. the nature of
the relationships between urban social movements and urban reproductive
crises on the one hand, and the various political projects of radicals,
radical-liberals and reformers on the other. It is with this in mind
that I return to the question of Castells1 (1977) central hypotheses
described earlier in the hope that we can explore them (i) in the histori-
cally specific context of contemporary South Africa and (ii) without
the unnecessary theoretical baggage of a functionalist conception of
the state. In so doing I hope it will be possible to suggest where
effective alliances can and can't be made in the politics of urban
reproduction that is likely to be forthcoming in South Africa.
THE HISTORICALLY SPECIFIC POLITICAL CONTEXT:
TRADE UNIONS, THE U.D.F., REFORM GROUPS AND THE STATE -
SOME ASSUMPTIONS
Since I have written of "historical specificity" it would seem necessary
to confront the reader, directly, at this stage with my own understanding
of the texture of progressive politics in South Africa today. None
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of us can escape the fact that we build analyses of our society, and
therefore our senses of appropriate action, upon some key assumptions
about progressive politics and it is best that I clarify my own position
in this regard.
My first assumption is that the restructuring of progressive politics
in South Africa is being forged in relation to a simultaneous restruc-
turing of the South African state. As most progressive observers recognize
(cf. Cobbett et al, 1985; Greenberg, 1984; Saul and Gelb, 1981) there
is not a one-way relationship here, but a complex process of mutual
interaction. One facet of this interaction is that state structures
tend to be extraordinarily divisive of opposition unity.
Specifically, I would like to suggest that what Wiehahn and associated
legislation is to progressive organization in the sphere of production,
spatial apartheid is to progressive organization in the sphere of consump-
tion. The estrangement between "the worker" and "the community", or
between "working" and "living", that is common in all capitalist societies
(cf. Harvey, 1978), is one that is augmented in Wiehahn et al's recommen-
dations for labour reforms on condition that trade unions distance
themselves from politics. Likewise, the parochial territorialism that
characterises many struggles in the sphere of reproduction in almost
all capitalist societies (cf. McCarthy, 1981), is supplemented and
underwritten in South Africa by the policies of Group Areas and Bantustans
which are currently being metamorphosed, if we are to believe Cobbett
et al (1985), into some type of regionalism-federalism. In the same
sense that trade union federations attempt to overcome the internecine
wrangling and competitiveness of mere trade-union consciousness, therefore,
organizations such as the United Democratic Front emerged to co-ordinate
opposition against the state mainly in the sphere of reproduction and
within the divisive context of apartheid.
I have no intention, here, to make the untennable argument that this
means that trade union federations and organizations such as the U.O.F.
amount to one and the same thing, separated only by their respective
balance of concerns for the politics of production versus thoseof repro-
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duction. Of course organizations such as FOSATU are more evidently
socialist than, say, the U.D.F., and this is precisely because they
are accountable to an exclusively working class constituency orgnized
at the point of production. Similarly, organizations such as the U.D.F.
are more evidently committed in ideals to social democracy, in contrast
to socialism, because their accountability is to cross-class alliances
which are opposed to their disadvantage or exploitation within the
sphere of reproduction. The point that is being made, however, is that
the sources of division and cohesion in opposition politics are as
much a product of their interaction with state structures as they are
a result of objectively conflicting material interests between its
various protagonists.
My second assumption about the texture of South Africa's current political
crisis is that its appearance is increasingly manifest at the level
of urban reproductive crises. This is in contrast, say, to the 1920's
when a political crisis could be unambiguously linked to crises in
production relations. I do not think it is helpful to invoke a platonic
distinction here between "appearances" and "essences", unless we are
happy to go along with its profoundly anti-democratic implications.
Neither do I wish to discount that, at some point in the future, produc-
tive crises will come to manifest themselves as the dominant, if not
exclusive, appearance of South Africa's political crisis. All that
is being suggested is that at this point in time the ideological express-
ion of South Africa's political crisis tends to be weighted in favour
of urban reproductive issues, possibly more so than at other periods
in South African history.
How do I make such a claim? The most obvious evidence in favour of
the suggestion derives from a reading of the ruling class and reformist
media. In research published elsewhere (McCarthy and Friedman, 1981;
McCarthy, 1983) I have made the point that South Africa's formal media
have interpreted the country's political crisis differently in different
periods. These different interpretations, it was argued, were in part
a reflection of different objective conditions of progressive mobilization,
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in part a reflection of state responses to such mobilizations, and
partly a response to changing conditions of capitalist accumulation
(for a more extended discussion see McCarthy and Friedman, 1985). Thus,
whilst in the 1920's the South African media focussed upon crises in
production relations, and whilst it paid attention to cities mainly
in terms of the installation of productive infrastructure, by the late
1940's the balance of interest had shifted to issues of urban reproduction.
Interrupted in the I960's, during a period of state and media interest
in rural productive and reproductive issues, urban reproductive issues
assumed centre-stage again on the ruling class and reformist ideological
agenda in the post 1975 period. For instance, journals with readerships
as diverse as the Financial Mail and the Weekend World responded to
the 1976 risings almost exclusively in urban reproductive terms, focuss-
ing attention in particular upon housing and education conditions
in black townships (McCarthy and Friedman, 1981). Progressive capital's
practical response, likewise, was to form an Urban Foundation with
reformist intervention directed at the educational and housing spheres.
Of course, it could be argued, according to one line of reasoning,
that this simply reflects a mystification of the "real issues" by
the bourgeois press and the agents of progressive capital. If by the
"real issues" is meant those issues that preoccupy members of the
working class, we can translate the assertion into a research hypothesis.
It is an hypothesis, however, which is difficult to verify through
the results of previous social research alone. Quite simply, no-one
seems to have done a serious survey analysis of the working classes
perceptions and definitions of South Africa's contemporary political
crisis. Rather, those surveys that have been done, simply ask workers
to identify uncritically with certain "political leaders", organizations
or prefabricated "viewpoints" and they accord little respect to workers
indigenous definitions of the situation. In consequence, the hypothesis
that the working class identifies the contemporary political crisis
largely in urban reproductive terms is one that must still be regarded
as part of the research agenda. Nevertheless, it will be agreed that
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current organizational indications are that "township conditions"
are increasingly being regarded as central to the interests of the
working class. As Freund et al (1985) observed, if the November Stayaway
proved anything, it was just this.
The third and final assumption I wish to briefly enunciate is that
the terrain of political opposition in South Africa is currently quite
fluid. Not only is the state rapidly redefining the terms of reform
and incorporation and thus, by implication, the terms of radical and
liberal response. A new trade union federation is in embryo, and popular
political organizations are busy redefining their strategies. The
space for academic intervention into these transformations is not
unlimited, but it exists all the same. It is within this context,
therefore, that I now turn to an empirical examination of the contempor-
ary character of urban social movements and perceptions of the urban
reproductive sphere, in the hope that the various protagonists of
opposition politics in South Africa today can make more informed
decisions about potential alliances in the sphere of urban politics.
URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND 'COMMUNITY' POLITICS IN
SOUTH AFRICA: THE ISSUES AND THE PRACTICES
There is, to date, no systematic and comprehensive analysis of urban
social movements in South Africa, although a number of potentially
informative projects are currently in progress (Williams, 1985; McCarthy
and Smit, 1983). On the basis of preliminary investigations, however,
we know that there have been periods of more or less intense U.S.M.
activity this century, and that we are currently in one of these
periods. Urban social movements in South Africa embrace a wide range
of issues, but a very large part of what they consistently address
are the differential costs and benefits of urban and regional develop-
ment and the state's apartheid structuring of political and geographical
relationships. Thus, for example, at stake in rent struggles are not
only the immediate problems of black poverty in South Africa and
the consequent inability to pay for housing, but also the legitimacy
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of the systems of Group Areas and bankrupt black local and regional
government dependencies. Likewise, transport struggles underline
the special geographical inequalities imposed upon Africans by apartheid,
the collaborator status of Bantustan governments, state support for
transport monopolies, and the inability of workers to afford their
lengthy journeys to work.
It would seem to me that it is partly because of such struggles that
the form that the state's current search for a modernized system
of political domination has taken is that of a search for "new spatial
co-ordinates", to use Cobbett et al's (1985) recent phrase. A point that
should be noted about such struggles is their simultaneity of political
and economic expression. Political and economic demands are often
so intertwined, in fact, that it becomes meaningless to ask which
are the "primary" or "secondary" causes of mobilization. The recent
history of Durban's housing movements exemplifies this well. Durban
has two major constellations of housing movement, structured largely
along racial lines because of the discrete geographical areas and
bureaucratic structures that Africans and Indians respectively operate
within, and must therefore confront.
The Durban Housing Action Committee (DHAC) was formed in 1980 ay
a federation of seven civic associations, but with time its influence
grew to other areas. The original seven affiliates were the Chatsworth
Housing Action Committee, the Newlands East Resident's Association,
the Cato Manor Resident's Association, the Asherville Housing Action
Committee, the Merebank Resident's Association, the Phoenix Working
Committee and Rent Action Committee and the Sydenham Heights Tenant's
Association.. What these organizations had in common were constituents
who were either averse to Durban City Council imposed rental increases
or Department of Community Development sponsored removals (D.H.A.C,
1981).
The Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC), also a development of the
1980's, brought together civic association organizers and a few disench-
anted community councillors from Lamontville, Chesterville, Klaarwater,
Hlambanati and Shakasville, and representatives from several Durban
hostels. What is interesting about the J.O.R.A.C. affiliates is that
they also were simultaneously threatened by P.N.A.B. imposed rent
increases and insecurity associated with proposed incorporation into
KwaZulu. Consequently these issues became the dual bases for popular
mobilization and protest (Reintges, 1985).
Both D.H.A.C. and J.O.R.A.C. were successful in securing moratoriums
on redestricting or removals and rent increases through their programmes
of protest politics. In this sense, to borrow a phrase from Curtis,
they were able to simultaneously deepen the state's legitimation
crisis and reduce the price of their constituents "capitalist wage-
commodities" (Curtis, 1984). Later, both D.H.A.C. and J.O.R.A.C.
became key Durban affiliates of the U.D.F. Because individual affiliates
of J.O.R.A.C. and D.H.A.C. could potentially be set against each
other by the state in making their respective demands for land, housing,
etc. (the geographically proximate Cato Manor Resident's Association
and Chesterville chapter of J.O.R.A.C. are a case in point) their
mutual affiliation to the U.D.F. was of functional significance to
everyday demands. For instance, if the Chesterville chapter of J.O.R.A.C.
were to press the Port Natal Administration Board or the Department
of Constitutional Development and Planning for the geographical expan-
sion of Chesterville township, this could lead to friction with the
Cato Manor Resident's association who were making their own land
dmands to the Durban City Council and House of Delegates. In this
context, the U.D.F. slogan "Apartheid Divides, U.D.F. Unites" was
more than a rhetorical, throw-away line. It encapsulated a key organiza-
tional principle required by those who sought to co-ordinate working-
class opposition within a sphere of reproduction that had been delibera-
tely fractured in the state's apartheid policies.
Transport struggles of late, in South Africa, share important features
with housing struggles although they differ slightly in terms of
mobilizing forces and the state agencies confronted. The specific
fractions of the state involved are often Bantustan governments
and the South African government's Department of Transport. And,
as has been noted before in publications together with Mark Swilling
(McCarthy and Swilling, 1984, 1985a; 1985b), transport struggles
often include trade union involvement in contrast to community or
civic association organizational domance. In the recent East London
bus boycotts, for example, the South African Allied Workers Union
(S.A.A.W.U.), until it was banned by the Ciskei state, played a
leading role in a successful boycott
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of buses partly owned by members of the Ciskei cabinet (Swilling,
1984). And in Empangeni, FOSATU joined forces with Inkatha to boycott
Empangeni Transport -- a subsidiary of United Transport, which is
one of the larger national transport corporations in South Africa.
In both these boycotts^ 'increases in bus fares were a triggering
factor related to the central state's current fiscal crisis and its
proclaimed 'inability' to meet demands for subsidized transport (cf.
McCarthy and Swilling, 1985a).
The way in which worker organizations related to the respective state
structures, so-called community organizations and transport corporations
in each instance, however, is instructive. In the East Louden case
S.A.A.W.U. appeared to have no serious rival "cow unity organization"
to come into conflict with and, in any event, it had for some time
taken up the politics of urban reproduction within its general agenda
of concerns. Thus, as Swilling (1984) has pointed out, workers were
very much in control of the "Committee of Ten" which co-ord*!nated
the East London Boycotts. Sehe's involvement in C.T.C., the transport
monopoly under criticism, however, provided a state-capital alliance
as an opponent which was relatively unambiguous in character. In
consequence, the battle lines wer€ quite sharply drawn and the stakes
very high indeed.
In the Empangeni case; however, the situation has been more complex.
For one, there was a working relationship between the region's major
so-called community organization - Inkatha - and the area's predominant
trade union - M.A.W.U. The interest of Inkatha in the boycott is
ambiguous because, as a popular organization, it both sought to redress
workers grievances and promote the interests of its more bourgeois
membership through the creation of competitor bus services with the
aid of K.F.C. finances. It is interesting, therefore, that the most
recent legal agreement between the Commuters Committee and Empangeni
Transport is that the boycott would end as and when competitor bus
services were visibly operating with the aid of K.F.C. finance. In
consequence, M.A.W.U. officials were left wondering about the interests
behind the free enterprise terms of settlement that they had come
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to agree to in coalition with Inkatha representatives (McCarthy and
Swilling, 1985b).
To summarize, therefore, both rent and transport struggles represent
attempts to reduce the price of so-called capitalist wage-commodities;
they both involve protest politics and boycott tactics; they involve
confrontation with various state agencies but usually bypass the
co-optive political structures created top-downwards for blacks;
and they occasionally, although by no means universally, develop
in co-operation with trade unions of the progressive labour movement.
In the instances cited, the economic demands of the various organiza-
tions were met, although it is arguable as to whether these gains
were either translated into heightened class-awareness or transforma-
tions in the balance of class forces vis a vis the state. Only the
East London bus boycott seems to have achieved substantial gains
in these last-mentioned respects, and it would serve as the only
clear support for Castells1 (1977) hypotheses amongst the examples
reviewed here. A more systematic survey of rent and transport struggles
nationwide, however, would be required before we could derive firm
conclusions on the validity of Castells1 (1977) hypotheses with respect
to transport and housing as sites of conflict. It is my intention
to pursue such a research programme during the next few years as
part of a wider strategy of research into geographical aspects of
urban reproductive crises. Hopefully, the research results can then
be shared, and critically appraised, together with the various progress-
ive organizations showing an interest in urban reproductive issues.
I would like to suggest at this stage that it would be unhelpful in such
a project to re-open any old wounds within the left by posing the
problem of urban practices before the problem of urban issues has
been properly addressed. Indeed, one might go so far as to say that
not only should the concept of "community versus worker politics"
(cf. Foster, 1982; Oavies and O'Meara, 1984) be regarded as inapprop-
riate to the task at hand; so too is the concept of urban social
movements untimely as a theoretical point of departure for progressive
urban research. My reasons for saying this are threefold:
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* First, the concept of urban social movements presupposes
a certain distance from the state in progressive urban
politics which is not necessarily acceptable to all progress-
ive groupings.
* Second, the concept, by presuming that practices will origin-
ate from the sphere of reproduction, possibly prejudices
analysis in specific organizational directions and helps
to perpetuate the working/living dichotomy that currently
bedevils progressive unity in South Africa.
* Thirdly, it tends to make unproblematic the question of
class, racial and regional alliances in the formulation
of an indigenous theory of progressive mobilization over
urban reproductive crises.
In saying this, I do not wish to foreclose on the Castells (1977)
hypotheses on U.S.M.'s before we have given them the benefit of doubt
in a careful and systematic research programme. All I am suggesting,
as I indicated before in the second section of this paper, is that
Castells (1977) himself would have argued that we ought to begin
with the reproductive issues and the associated structural contradic-
tions that they express, and then work from here towards organizational
or tactical conclusions. It is with this in mind that I turn, now,
to a concluding examination of transport and housing as reproductive
issues with structural origins in South African society.
URBAN REPRODUCTIVE CRISES: STRUCTURAL ORIGINS
AND POPULAR PERCEPTIONS
We owe it largely to reformist dialogue with conservative forces
within the state to have discovered the depth of the state's current
crisis with regard to the cities as reproductive entities. An important
part of the reformists plea for privatizing, for example, black housing
and transport is an appreciation of the state's current so-called
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Figure 1: Pattern of annual state expenditures on subsidies to
bus companies in South Africa carrying Coloured and Black commuters
(Source: South Africa, 1983a, p.37).
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"fiseal crisis", and the potential it has to become deepened by past
patterns of intervention into urban reproduction. Evidence presented
to the Welgemoed Commission of Inquiry into bus transportation, for
example, illustrates the type of fiscal drain posed by fare subsidies
very well (Figure 1). Partly because of a legacy of spatial idiosyn-
cracies created by Verwoedian apartheid, and partly because of the
very rapid rate of proletarianization and urbanization in South Africa,
fears are now expressed that a veritable tidal wave of subsidy demands
will be forthcoming if the state does not rapidly extricate itself
from direct intervention into urban reproduction. This concern is
not simply limited to bus transportation, of course. It extends to
train transportation, the provision of residential services, housing,
and so on. With specific reference to the last mentioned problem,
current state strategy seems to be either that of advocating benign
neglect (the so-called "self-help" solution) or that of encouraging
the formation of housing utility companies with private funding and
directorships. In addition, there is also the initiative to sell
virtually all of the current state owned housing stock to its inhabi-
tants (cf. Mabin and Parnell, 1983).
These state initiatives are not without their own complications.
In the area of bus transportation, for example, there are some very
large monopolies with vested interests in past policies who can be
expected to vigorously oppose state withdrawal, and the parallel
promotion of the interests of a black transportation petty bourgeoisie
(cf. McCarthy and Swilling, 1985b, p.28). And, in the area of housing
provision, a number of important obstacles remain to reformist initia-
tives, not the least being the lack of accumulated capital amongst
state tenants which might enable them to meet the substantial trans-
actions costs of homeownership. In consequence, as Mabin and Parnell
(1983) have aptly warned, current policies may well lead to the replace-
ment of the state as landlord by an indigenous rentier class.
All of this, in turn, suggests that a byproduct, if not intention,
of current reformist initiatives will be to accelerate the process
of class differentiation within urban black South Africa. Given that
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this is the case, progressive organizations will no doubt feel the
need, more urgently than ever, to reappraise their tactics and strategies
with regard to the sphere of urban politics. An important aspect of
such a reappraisal, I would argue, will be some systematic understanding
of the way in which South Africa's reproductive crises are perceived
by different groups.
A survey for which I was responsible in the Eastern Cape might be helpful
in this regard. Here 735 residents of the African townships of Port
Elizabeth, Uitenhage, Grahamstown, Kingwilliamstown and East London/Mdant-
sane were interviewed in 1981. One of the questions put to the respondents
was "what do you think are the most important problems that people
face in this (the respondent's) area?" The absolute and relative frequency
with which different problems were spontaneously mentioned by respondents
is indicated in Table 1. Figures are given for the total sample, for
women only, for blue collar workers, for students, and for owners,
managers and professionals. This breakdown allows us to explore the
relative validity of a number of hypotheses put forward about the nature
of urban reproductive "interests".
First, it should be evident from Table 1 that reformist presuppositions
about supposedly widespread sentiment in favour of homeownership are
ill-founded. The lack of homeownership was the second least often men-
tioned problem in the Eastern Cape, amongst a range of 21 spontaneously
mentioned problem areas. This possibly assists in understanding why,
up to this point, the state's so-called "grand sale" of half a million
homes has been such a spectacular failure in almost all areas except
the Witwatersrand. The lack of accumulated capital has already been
mentioned as a factor militating against working class home-ownership
in particular (transactions costs in Durban's black townships, for
example, require approximately R3000 in 'up front1 cash to pay surveyors
and lawyers). However, it can be noted from Table 1 that all subsamples
of the population accord a very low priority to homeownership. Apart
from a lack of capital to buy, it would seem, there is also a lack
of interest. In consequence, if Black townships in the Durban Municipal
area can be taken as illustrative of national trends, only fifty one
Table 1: Frequency of spontaneously mentioned "most important problems" in
Eastern Cape townships*
Problem
Need for more and better
quality houses
Unemployment, lack of
jobs, poor wages etc.
Electricity & phone
services inadequate and/
or expensive
Poor public transport &
costs of transport
Bad roads and street
lighting
High rents and general
C.O.L.
Better/cheaper schooling
facilities required
Safety and crime,
police patrols
Delinquency, drinking anc
social pathologies
Unhealthy squatter
conditions
Congestion and over-
crowding
Better sanitary systems,
water supply & toilets
General residential
services
Recreational facilities
needed
Overall
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Total
Sample
(330)
45%
(293)
40%
(215)
29%
(175)
24 %
(172)
23%
(159)
22%
(159)
22%
(141)
19%
(114)
16%
(98)
13%
(96)
13%
(84)
11%
(71)
10%
(65)
9%
remales
(160)
43%
(165)
44%
(124)
34%
(88)
24%
(82)
22%
(82)
22%
(67)
18%
(78)
21%
(51)
14%
(50)
14%
(51)
14%
(49)
13%
(36)
10%
(27)
7%
Blue Collar 5
Workers
(17)
15%
(21)
19%
(41)
37%
(33)
32%
(33)
30%
(38)
34%
(16)
14%
(15)
14%
(16)
14%
(14)
13%
(13)
12%
(12)
11%
(8)
7%
(6)
5%
itudents
(23)
35%
(18)
27%
(18)
27%
(8)
12%
(12)
18%
(9)
14%
(26)
39%
(7)
11%
(6)
9%
(10)
15%
(7)
11%
(5)
(3)
5%
(14)
21%
Petty
Bourg.
(33)
51%
(18)
27%
(18)
27%
(14)
21%
(13)
20%
(8)
12%
(27)
41%
(10)
15%
(10)
15%
(10)
15%
(7)
11%
(6)
9%
(11)
17%
(11)
17%
Problem
Creches and sccial
facilities needed
Inconvenient location/
distance to work
More or better shopping
facilities needed
Medical facilities not
good and too far away
Need for bigger yards
Homeownership wanted
Segregation and racial
discrimination
Overall
Rank
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Total
Sample
(59)
8%
(55)
1%
(42)
6%
(23)
3%
(20)
3%
(10)
1*
(6)
1%
Females
(25)
7%
(28)
8%
(17)
5%
(17)
5%
(12)
3%
(7)
2%
(2)
1%
Blue Collar
Workers
(5)
5%
(10)
9%
(7)
6%
(3)
3%
(5)
5%
(4)
4%
0%
Students
(14)
21%
(5)
8%
(4)
6%
0%
(3)
5%
(1)
2%
(1)
2%
Petty
Bourg.
(4)
6%
(3)
(5)
5%
(2)
3%
(1)
2%
-
(1)
2%
* Note: The total sample size is 735. This is made up of 367 males and
368 females. In the 'petty bourg.1 class there were 65 managers, profession-
als and owners. White collar workers (data not presented for this group
here) totalled 22!; blue collar workers 111; labourers and unskilled workers
(data not presented for this group here) totalled 108; and there were
68 unemployed, 32 housewives, 54 self employed, and 66 students.
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houses out of potential thousands have been sold up to this point (August,
1985) in terms of the "grand sale" announced in early 1983.
A second interesting aspect of the results is that, aside from some
very minor differences, women's priorities are remarkably similar to
the group's as a whole. Perhaps at this stage, therefore, it is premature
to speak of a di sti ncti ve women's 'perspecti ve' on township problems.
This is surprising, since women have often been at the organizational
forefront of urban social movements in South Africa (Lapchick and Urdang,
1982). A possible explanation for this anomoly, however, may lie in
Curtis' (1984) suggestion that it is the differentially low wages and
real consumption levels of women that have placed them "at the forefront
of many labour, consumer, pass, rent, and fare struggles in South Africa".
That is to say, women identify the same kinds of township problems
as men, but they feel them more acutely. In addition, it is possible
that they have more time to devote to non-workplace organizing.
Thirdly, and perhaps most interestingly, it can be seen from Table
1 that there are clearly identifiable differences in perspective between
blue collar workers, students and the petty bourgeoisie. The four major
areas of blue collar worker concern, in which interest was considerably
higher than amongst other groups were: electricity and phone services
(costs and inadequacy), high rents (and associated C.O.L. factors),
expensive and poor quality public transport services, and bad roads
and street lighting. By contrast, the interest of the petty bourgeois
group converged upon the need for more, and especially better quality,
housing, and the need for better and cheaper schooling facilities.
These interests were very similar to those of the student sample.
The Eastern Cape survey results, I believe, help us to understand why
rents and transport (and to a certain extent utility costs) can become
working class issues around which urban social movements and/or trade
unions can command broad support in their challenges to the state over
the abysmal condition of the so-called "social wage". The results also
serve as a reminder that the interests of students and petty bourgeoisie
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often coincide, and that these interests tend to centre upon those
aspects of township life that provide barriers to the process of class
mobility.
CONCLUSION
One survey, of course, even when the sample size is generous, is hardly
the basis for the derivation of firm strategic conclusions. There are,
nevertheless, a number of provocative strategic questions raised by
the Eastern Cape survey which do seem worthy of discussion in the conclu-
sion to this paper. Of particular interest here is the question of
potential alliances in the area of urban political practices.
Quite simply, given the evidence in favour of the working class character
of rents, transport and utility issues on the one hand, and the broad
concordance of petty bourgeois and student perspectives on the other,
recent alliances over urban reproductive crises in South Africa seem
irrational, at least when judged in "class politics" terms. Freund
et al's (1985) rendition of the November stayaway, for example, emphasised
an apparently organic link between worker and student demands. Yet,
at the same time, in Natal where major U.D.F. affiliates such as D.H.A.C.
and J.O.R.A.C. practice an urban politics focussing upon working class
interests, there is not a good working relationship between these organiz-
ations and major trade union groupings. Indeed the only working relation-
ship that has been struck so far in Natal over reproductive issues
has been an informal liaison between M.A.W.U. and Inkatha over Empangeni
bus fares and, as we have seen, the former have been ambivalent partners
in the project partly because of the "free enterprise" terms of the
forced solution. Moreover Inkatha, for their own part, have also proved
unwilling allies in the project (incorrectly) accusing F.O.S.A.T.U.,
ultimately, of liaison with the U.D.F. and "jealousy" over the question
of who has the right to organize the Empangeni bus drivers (Zululand
Observer, 3/5/1985). In consequence, the Commuters Committee has had
to disband as differences between Inkatha and trade union members reached
a crisis point in July, 1985 (Byerly, 1985). In addition F.O.S.A.T.U.'s
Alec Erwin and U.D.F.'s Billy Nair, commenting on a draft of this
paper, each made it clear that diferent conceptions of "democratic
practice" and different views on the national question still made liaison
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between their respective organizations problematic, even when working
class issues alone were at stake.
All of this, it seems to me, suggests one of two conclusions. Either
Anderson (1984) and others are correct when they argue that "the national
question" is the most glaring omission in the socialists analytical
tool bag, or we are at present severely underequipped in dealing, at
the organizational level, with urban reproductive issues as a terrain
for class politics. Perhaps the problem is not an either/or one, however,
in that the first conclusion requires mainly further analysis in proving
it correct or incorrect, whereas the latter conclusion can well be
changed by future practices.
The question of which practices will emerge in the future is not something
that social research can determine, of course, but hopefully it can
assist in the process of practical developments. The state and liberal-
reformers, for their own parts, certainly have formidable resources
and research apparatuses at their disposal to investigate and intervene
into urban reproductive crises. If progressives remain more interested
in internal divisions than in potential "unification tendencies" (Mingione,
1981) with respect to urban issues, we can only contribute towards
our own historical marginalization.
It is possible, however, that the state itself is constructing a new
arena within which such unification tendencies can be realized. With
the introduction of the new Regional Services Councils this year (Durban's
R.S.C. is to be functioning by the end of 1985), a number of developments
are likely to emerge. On the one hand it seems certain that even liberal-
reformers will be strongly opposed to the exclusively racial character
of the Primary Local Authorities (P.L.A.'s) of which the R.S.C.'s
are aggregates (cf. Financial Mail, 2/8/1985, p.55). In this there
is likely to be agreement with radical-liberals and socialists. However,
it is well known that the Group Areas Act is currently under review
so as to allow free geographical association of commercial capital
and a degree of intra-urban mobility for a fraction of the other than
white population who can afford to buy into elite residential areas.
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In addition the Separate Amenities Act is likely to be modified, if
not discarded. This may appease reform-liberals and possibly even
some radical-liberals, but it will be of relatively little consequence
to the working classes. What is likely to result is something akin
to a geographical reversal of the typical pattern of metropolitan
jurisdictional fragmentation and class and racial segregation operating
in the United States (cf. Cox, 1973; Johnston, 1984): That is say,
a pattern in which there is a resource rich, and predominantly upper
class occupied central municipality surrounded by resource poor and
predominantly working class occupied suburbs. Within Primary Local
Authorities, in other words, there is likely to be substantial class
homogeneity.
The Regional Services Councils, on the other hand, will now be providing
and/or regulating many of the services in the metropolitan areas that
the working classes manifestly take an interest in, including electricity,
water, residential infrastructure and transport. The position of house
rentals is as yet unclear, although it seems inevitable that the state
will press ahead with its plans for privatization, whilst raising
rentals all the time (ie increasing the costs of non-ownership). This
is likely in the short term to generate intensified legitimacy struggles
at the local level over the costs and tenure of housing amongst the
working classes. In the longer term, however, the housing question
seems set to become transformed into a landlord-tenant struggle operating
mainly outside state structures. Since the Regional Services Councils
will be funded largely by a turnover and employment tax collected
directly from capitalists, and since the disbursement of this surplus
through the R.S.C.'s impinges directly upon those aspects of urban
living conditions that the working classes profess an interest in,
the R.S.C.'s may yet become important sites of class struggle over
the social wage.
A major problem here, however, will be the racial specificity of the
system of representation and, even though all metropolitan residents
are potential voters at the local level, the age-old question of whether
or not to participate within racist political structures is likely
to be posed yet again. It is here that socialists may well find common
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cause with reform-liberals and radical-liberals to demand certain
amendments to the Regional Services Act as preconditions for participa-
tion. These preconditions would have to be worked out in the political
process, of course, in order to be politically tractable. There is,
however, again room for academic intervention here by decoding the
package of recent legislation associated with the Regional Services
Councils for the lay person. But that is a subject for another paper.
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